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Abstract—Multiple-operators (multi-OPs) spectrum sharing
mechanism can effectively improve the spectrum utilization
in fifth-generation (5G) wireless communication networks. The
secondary users are introduced to opportunistically access the
licensed spectrum of idle operators (OPs). However, the identity
privacy and data security issues raise great concerns about the
secure spectrum sharing among multi-OPs. To address these
challenges, a consortium blockchain trust framework is proposed
for the spectrum sharing in multi-OPs wireless communication
networks in this paper. A real consortium blockchain is con-
structed among multi-OPs. The Multi-Ops Spectrum Sharing
(MOSS) smart contract is designed on the constructed con-
sortium blockchain to implement the spectrum trading among
multi-OPs. Without the need of trustless spectrum broker, the
MOSS smart contract enforces multi-OPs to share the spectrum
truthfully and designs a punishment mechanism to punish ma-
licious OPs. Simulation results tested on the Remix integrated
development environment (IDE) indicate the feasibility of the
designed MOSS smart contract. The performance analysis of the
proposed consortium blockchain trust framework demonstrates
that the privacy, openness and fairness of the proposed solution
are better than traditional spectrum allocation solutions.
Index Terms—Spectrum sharing, consortium blockchain,
smart contract, privacy, security.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS spectrum, as a scarce natural resource, isan essential foundation to support wireless communi-
cations [1]. The exclusive spectrum is staticlly allocated to
an operator (OP) in traditional spectrum management solu-
tions. Based on the statistics in the Federal Communications
Commissions investigation report [2], the utilization of the
licensed spectrum ranges from 15% to 85% with traditional
static spectrum allocation solutions. The communication traffic
has exploded with the rise of high definition (HD) video
transmission, virtual reality (VR), augmented reality (AR) and
other high-bandwidth services in fifth-generation (5G) wireless
communication networks [3]. The multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) technology [4] and the interference manage-
ment mechanism [5] have been proposed to achieve high
data transmission rate and delay-sensitive requirement [6].
The traditional static spectrum allocation and management
solutions would cause the spectrum underutilization and in-
efficiency, which have great limitations on meeting traffic
needs of 5G wireless communication networks. Therefore,
it is urgent to find new solutions to improve the spectrum
utilization for the spectrum management and allocation in
wireless communication networks.
Dynamic spectrum sharing in cognitive radio (CR) networks
is a feasible solution to relieve the shortage and underutiliza-
tion of spectrum resources [7], [8]. CR is defined as an in-
telligent wireless communication system which can sense and
learn from the surrounding environment by the understanding-
by-building method [8]. Based on the cognitive and recon-
figurable abilities of CR, primary users (PUs) can share its
licensed spectrum with secondary users (SUs) to improve the
spectrum utilization [9]. The microeconomic theories were
adopted to realize the dynamic spectrum sharing between PUs
and SUs. The auction-based approach was designed in [10]
to solve the spectrum sharing between macro base stations
(MBS) and femto access points (FAP), who acted as the
bidder for the additional spectrum of MBSs. The many-to-one
stable matching game theory and the stochastic geometrical
approaches were used in [11] to tackle the dynamic spec-
trum sharing among network OPs. Two main architectures
have been proposed in previous studies of dynamic spectrum
sharing among multi-operators (multi-OPs). In the centralized
spectrum sharing architecture, a spectrum broker was intro-
duced to be responsible for the spectrum allocation between
participating PUs and SUs [12]. In order to share the spectrum
efficiently, both PUs and SUs needed to interact the private
information with the trustless spectrum broker. In this case, the
interaction suffered from a single-point failure and privacy dis-
closure. The distributed spectrum sharing architecture, where
participating PUs and SUs needed to interact with each other,
might face the challenge of huge communication cost and
privacy leakage [13]. Although both architectures could relieve
the spectrum shortage and improved the spectrum utilization,
security issues of interaction among mutual-trustless entities
are severe and have not been considered in previous studies.
Therefore, it is necessary to propose an efficient solution
to guarantee the secure interaction in the dynamic spectrum
sharing among multi-OPs.
Recently, the promising Ethereum blockchain [14] and
smart contract [15] technologies have been widely used in
many fields due to its decentralization and security. The smart
contract consists of many predefined functions which can be
triggered by transactions to realize specific functionalities.
Transactions are recorded on the distributed ledger maintained
by Ethereum consensus nodes. All blockchain nodes can send
transactions, which are not only payment transferrings but
also function calls in smart contracts. Each transaction sent
by nodes costs gas to prevent malicious nodes from sending
too many meaningless transactions on the blockchain. Gas is
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2the basic unit to measure the amount of computing resources
consumed by a transaction on the Ethereum [16]. A healthcare
information exchange blockchain platform was built in [17],
which combined the off-chain storage and on-chain verifica-
tion to ensure the privacy and authentication of healthcare
data. An energy blockchain was proposed to provide secure
charging services for electric vehicles [18]. However, only
a few studies have applied the blockchain to the scenario
of spectrum sharing in wireless communication networks. A
Spectrum Sensing as a Service (SPASS) architecture was
proposed to realize the payment transferring of outsourced
spectrum sensing services through the smart contract [19]. The
feasibility of applying the smart contract-enabled blockchain
technology to the spectrum sharing was analyzed in [20] from
five aspects, including the decentralization, the transparency,
the irreversibility, the availability and the security. In [21],
considering that some home or business users could receive a
certain revenue by providing spectrum sensing services for
nodes in SU networks, a smart contract was designed to
implement Service Level Agreements (SLAs) between mobile
OPs and community service providers. However, due to the
high cost associated with the blockchain and the extra gas
cost of calling functions in the smart contract, the efficient
spectrum sharing cannot be achieved in existing blockchain
studies.
To overcome these issues, in this paper, a consor-
tium blockchain is constructed for the spectrum sharing in
multi-OPs wireless communication networks. The consor-
tium blockchain is a permissioned blockchain with the high
throughput and short delay. The multi-OPs acted as authorized
nodes are required to be authenticated the certificate by
the government before joining in the constructed consortium
blockchain. The Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT)
consensus algorithm is adopted in the consortium blockchain,
requiring only the modest cost and computation power. In
this paper, the Multi-OPs Spectrum Sharing (MOSS) smart
contract is designed in the consortium blockchain for spec-
trum sharing in wireless communication networks. Without
a trustless spectrum broker, different OPs can autonomously
trade the spectrum by calling functions defined in the MOSS
smart contract.
The main contributions in this paper are described as
follows.
1) Based on the constructed consortium blockchain, a de-
centralized and secure framework is proposed for the
spectrum sharing in multi-OPs wireless communication
networks. The double auction and free-trading market
are introduced to design the MOSS smart contract,
which enables multi-OPs to autonomously share the
spectrum in wireless communication networks.
2) The MOSS smart contract is written in the solidity
language and tested in the Remix integrated develop-
ment environment (IDE). The gas cost of each function
defined in the MOSS smart contract is estimated. The
testing results demonstrate that the designed MOSS
smart contract is feasible to the spectrum sharing among
multi-OPs and requires the only modest gas cost for
OPs to implement the spectrum sharing based on the
consortium blockchain.
3) The security and reliability of the proposed spectrum
sharing solution are analyzed. The performance analysis
demonstrates that the privacy, openness and fairness of
the proposed solution are better than traditional spectrum
allocation solutions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, a consortium blockchain trust framework is proposed for
the spectrum sharing in multi-OPs wireless communication
networks. In Section III, the MOSS smart contract is designed.
In Section IV, experimental results are presented. The security
and reliability analysis are also discussed. Finally, Section V
concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM FRAMEWORK
Fig. 1. Consortium blockchain in multi-Operators wireless communication
networks.
The consortium blockchain for the spectrum sharing among
multi-OPs is shown in Fig 1. The MBS and Small Cell Base
Stations (SBS) of multi-OPs coexist in the specific region,
where each OP includes a MBS covering a number of SBSs
[22]. The MBS and SBSs of each OP analyze the spectrum
usage and user locations reported by user terminals in the
specific region. The MBS and SBSs of each OP report analy-
sis results to the corresponding servicer, i.e., the Operation
Administration and Maintenance (OAM) servicer, which is
responsible for the spectrum management among associated
MBS and SBSs. Based on the analysis results collected from
the MBS and SBSs, the OAM servicer of each OP can
reasonably predict the spectrum demand during the period
of [tb , te]. A spectrum trading market can be established to
satisfy different spectrum demands of multi-OPs. The MOSS
smart contract is designed to realize the spectrum trading
and allocation among multi-OPs. The proposed consortium
blockchain trust framework consists of three types of entities
for the spectrum sharing in multi-OPs wireless communication
networks: the government, buyer OPs group and seller OPs
group.
31) Government: Considering the fact that the deploy of
smart contract needs to cost large gas and selfish OPs are
unwilling to pay for it, the government is introduced to
deploy the MOSS smart contract. Unlike the spectrum broker
who is responsible for the spectrum allocation in previous
studies, the government only deploys the MOSS smart contract
and supervises the whole spectrum sharing process. In the
proposed framework, the MOSS smart contract is deployed at
time t0 by the government. Simultaneously, the bidding time
is initialized as tbid and the free-trading time is initialized as
tfree when the MOSS smart contract is deployed. The free-
trading market is triggered at time t1(t1 > (t0 + tbid)) by
the government. The valid bidding duration is [t0 , t0 + tbid]
((t0 + tbid) < tb), and the valid free-trading duration is
[t1 , t1 + tfree]((t1 + tfree) < tb).
2) Seller OPs group: The seller OPs group is constituted
by M(M= {1, 2, · · · ,M}) OPs. The m-th OP decides to sell
Bm (Bm ≤ Btotm ,m ∈M) bandwidth, where Btotm is the total
bandwidth owned by the m-th OP. In order to guarantee the
quality of service (QoS) of service users associated with the
m-th OP during the period of [tb , te], the m-th OP retains
Bleftm bandwidth to serve associated users. B
left
m meets the
following requirement:
Bleftm = B
tot
m −Bm ≥ Breqm ,∀m ∈M, (1)
where Breqm is the bandwidth required by the m-th OP to
provide the specific QoS for associated users, pm is the price
per unit bandwidth bid by the m-th OP.
3) Buyer OPs group: The buyer OPs group is constituted
by N (N = {1, 2, · · · , N}) OPs. The n-th OP decides to buy
Wn bandwidth based on the prediction of spectrum demand
during the period of [tb , te], and the bid price per unit
bandwidth is set as cn.
Underloaded OPs who may have the idle spectrum during
the period of [tb , te] can join the seller OPs group and share
their idle spectrum with a certain price. As a consequence, the
revenue and spectrum utilization of underloaded OPs can be
improved. Overloaded Ops, whose licensed spectrum is unable
to meet needs of all users during the period of [tb , te], can join
the buyer OPs group to purchase the spectrum from the seller
OPs group. With the spectrum purchased from seller OPs, the
QoS of users served by overloaded OPs can be improved.
Both the spectrum trading and payment transferring between
seller OPs and buyer OPs are executed by calling specific
functions defined in the MOSS smart contract. Each entity
has a unique Ethereum address. Transactions are recorded in
the constructed consortium blockchain. During the period of
[t0 , t0 + tbid], M seller OPs and N buyer OPs independently
register and set the bid through the MOSS smart contract.
As the registration period ends, the government invokes the
MOSS smart contract to perform the spectrum auction among
registered seller and buyer OPs. If there exist unsuccessful
matches between buyer OPs and seller OPs, the government
invokes the MOSS smart contract to open the free-trading mar-
ket. Unsuccessfully matched OPs can choose whether to enter
the free-trading market during the period of [t1 , t1 + tfree], and
adjust their bids based on matched results of the spectrum
auction stage. Finally, all OPs can invoke the MOSS smart
TABLE I
EXPLANATION OF PARAMETERS.
Notations Descriptions
t0 Time to deploy the MOSS
tbid Time of bidding registration
tfree Time of free-trading market
t1 Time to begin the free-trading market
Bm The bandwidth selled by the m-th op
pm Price per unit bandwidth of the m-th op
Wn The bandwidth bought by the n-th op
cn Price per unit bandwidth of the n-th op
asks The registration set of seller OPs
bids The registration set of buyer OPs
deposit The balance of OP in the Ethereum account
addrSm Ethereum address of the m-th op
addrBn Ethereum address of the n-th op
msg.sender The sending address of transaction
addr The address of OP in the free-trading market
price The latest price of OP in the free-trading
market
bandwidth The latest bid bandwidth of OP in the free-
trading market
role The seller/buyer OP
contract to take back the rest of their deposit. A round
of spectrum sharing among multi-Ops during the period of
[tb , te] is finished.
III. SMART CONTRACT DESIGN
In this section, the flow of designed MOSS smart contract is
introduced. The explanation of parameters are shown in Table
1.
In the MOSS smart contract, the multi-OPs spectrum shar-
ing process is divided into three stages: the registration of
OPs, the spectrum trading and the payment clearing. Functions
defined in the MOSS smart contract should be agreed by
all OPs before the MOSS smart contract is deployed in the
consortium blockchain. The government sends a transaction
to deploy the MOSS smart contract at time t0. The Ethereum
address of MOSS smart contract is known by all OPs once
this transaction is packaged into the valid block. In Ethereum,
the time control can be determined by the unix timestamp.
The timestamp can be used in the MOSS smart contract to
judge the timeliness of transactions. The function call that is
invalid in the current period will not be packaged into the
block by miners. The detailed flow of MOSS smart contract
is shown in Fig 2 (the source code of MOSS smart contract
can be seen in the github at https://github.com/cherry1124/
MOSS CONTRACT) and is described as follows.
A. The registration of OPs
In the registration stage of OPs, the BidOrAskSubmit( )
function is designed to submit the bid of multi-OPs and the
RegistrationEnd( ) function is designed to judge whether the
registration process is ended. The specific functionalities of
BidOrAskSubmit( ) and RegistrationEnd( ) are described as
follows.
• BidOrAskSubmit( ): During the period of [t0 , t0 + tbid],
OPs call the BidOrAskSubmit( ) when they want to
participate in the spectrum sharing and declare whether
they are buyer OPs or seller OPs. The bandwidth and
4Fig. 2. Flow of the designed MOSS smart contract.
price per unit bandwidth they want to buy or sell also
need to be given. The BidOrAskSubmit( ) function is set
as payable, which represents that the BidOrAskSubmit( )
have the functionality of Ether transferring. The Ether is
the common digital currency in the Ethereum. All OPs
must deposit more than 1 eth into the address of MOSS
smart contract when the BidOrAskSubmit( ) is called.
Here eth refers to a unit of Ether. The requirement of
deposit can protect the spectrum trading process against
interferences from some malicious nodes and be used
for the payment transferring of spectrum trading. The
remaining deposit can be returned back to the Ethereum
account of corresponding OP. The LogRegisterOp event
is defined in the BidOrAskSubmit( ). If OPs successfully
register in the MOSS smart contract and submit their bid,
the LogRegisterOp event will be triggered. All blockchain
nodes listening for this event will know the bid infor-
mation of registered OPs, from which unregistered OPs
can dynamically adjust their demands and bids. The bid
information is sent as a transaction via the anonymous
Ethereum address of each OP. Therefore, the real identity
of OPs will not be revealed and the private information
of OPs will be protected.
• RegistrationEnd( ): Multi-OPs can call the Registratio-
nEnd( ) function at any time to determine whether the
registration stage is ended. The timestamp of transactions
sent by OPs is represented by now. If now > (t0 + tbid),
the registration stage is already ended. Therefore OPs
cannot call the BidOrAskSubmit( ) function to submit
the bid and cannot participate in this round of spectrum
sharing.
B. The spectrum trading
The process of spectrum trading is divided into two sub-
stages. The first sub-stage is the spectrum auction among
multi-OPs, which mainly includes three functions: the sor-
tAskByIncrease( ), the sortBidByDecrease( ), the DoubleAuc-
tion( ). The second sub-stage is mainly designed for OPs who
are fail to match in the stage of spectrum auction and provides
a free-trading market for unsuccessfully matched OPs. The
second sub-stage includes four functions: the freeTradeBegin(
), the orderResponse( ), the deleteOrder( ), and the MarketEnd(
). The specific functionalities of functions contained in two
sub-stages are described as follows.
• sortAskByIncrease( ): As the registration stage of OPs
ended, the government calls the sortAskByIncrease( ) in
the MOSS smart contract to sort M seller OPs by the
price in ascending order.
• sortBidByDecrease( ): The government also calls the
sortBidByDecrease( ) to sort N buyer OPs by the price
in descending order.
Algorithm 1 Spectrum Auction
Input:asks=
{(
p1, B1, addr
S
1
)
, · · · , (pM , BM , addrSM)}
// (p1 ≤ · · · ≤ pM )
bids=
{(
c1,W1, addr
B
1
)
, · · · , (pN ,WN , addrBN)}
// (c1 ≥ · · · ≥ cN )
doubleAuctionFinish=false
Output: Successfully matched result
1: bidsLength=bids.length
2: asksLength=asks.length
3: doubleAuctionFinish=false
4: while bidsLength! = {} & asksLength! = {} &
(c1 ≥ p1) do
5: dealPrice=(p1 + c1) /2
6: dealAmount=min {B1,W1}
7: totalMoney=dealPrice*dealAmount
8: deposit
[
addrB1
]
= deposit
[
addrB1
]− totalMoney
9: deposit
[
addrS1
]
= deposit
[
addrS1
]
+ totalMoney
10: (p1, B1)← (p1, B1 − dealAmount)
11: (c1,W1)← (c1,W1 − dealAmount)
12: if (W1==0) then
13: for
(
cn,Wn, addr
B
n
) ∈ bids do
14:
(
cn,Wn, addr
B
n
)←(
cn+1,Wn+1, addr
B
n+1
)
15: end for
16: else if (B1==0) then
17: for
(
pm, Bm, addr
S
m
) ∈ asks do
18:
(
pm, Bm, addr
S
m
)←(
pm+1, Bm+1, addr
S
m+1
)
19: end for
20: end if
21: end while
22: doubleAuctionFinish=true
• DoubleAuction( ): The government calls the DoubleAuc-
tion( ) to auction the spectrum for all registered OPs after
the sorting is completed. The process of DoubleAuction(
) is shown in Algorithm 1. The miner who packages the
specific transaction into the block performs the corre-
sponding operations:
1) registered buyer OPs and seller OPs are matched
5based on the spectrum auction algorithm defined
in the DoubleAuction( ). The successfully matched
price per unit bandwidth is set as the average price
of the matched buyer OP and seller OP.
2) Second, based on the matched price and bandwidth
quantity, the expense of buyer OPs and the income
of seller OPs are calculated.
3) Third, the spectrum auction is finished until the
bidding queue have been fully matched or the lowest
seller price is higher than the highest buyer price.
The variable doubleAuctionFinish defined in the MOSS
smart contract represents the state of spectrum auction.
When the value of doubleAuctionFinish changes from
false to true, all OPs and the government who inquire
the doubleAuctionFinish can know that the spectrum
allocation has already completed. The LogDealRecord
event is defined in the MOSS smart contract. When
buyer OPs and seller OPs have a successful match, the
LogDealRecord will be triggered. All nodes listening for
the LogDealRecord will know the successful match infor-
mation. The repeated auction of spectrum and the mutual
interferences of spectrum usage are avoided based on
the proposed spectrum allocation scheme. The openness
of spectrum sharing can be guaranteed in the proposed
solution.
• freeTradeBegin( ): If there exist unsuccessful matched
OPs in the DoubleAuction( ), the government will call
the freeTradeBegin( ) at time t1 to open the free-
trading market. The valid period of free-trading market
is [t1 , t1 + tfree].
• orderResponse( ): During the period of [t1 , t1 + tfree],
OPs who fail to match in the DoubleAuction( ) can choose
whether to enter the free-trading market. Based on the
matched information in the spectrum auction stage, seller
OPs who decide to enter the free-trading market can call
the orderResponse( ) to resubmit the adjusted price and
the bandwidth demand. Once the latest bid information
is submitted successfully, the LogFreeMarketOrder event
is triggered to declare the newly updated price infor-
mation of OPs. Buyer OPs can call the orderResponse(
) to purchase the desired spectrum based on the latest
spectrum information and reach a successful match. All
the updated bid information and successful match result
will be recorded in the consortium blockchain by miners.
The flow of orderResponse( ) is shown in Algorithm 2.
• deleteOrder( ): If the OP fails to match in the DoubleAuc-
tion( ) and refuses to enter the free-trading market, the
OP can call the deleteOrder( ) to clear the bid information
and exit the spectrum sharing market.
• MarketEnd( ): Multi-OPs and the government can call
the MarketEnd( ) to determine whether the free-trading
market is ended. If now > (t1 + tfree), the OP cannot call
the orderResponse( ) since the free-trading market has
already ended. When the free-trading market is ended,
the whole spectrum sharing process is finished. If there
exist OPs who still want to join the spectrum sharing,
they can only wait for the next new round of spectrum
sharing.
Algorithm 2 Free-trading Market
Input: addr , price , bandwidth , role
Output: Successfully matched result
1: if role==true then
2: new price= price
3: new band= bandwidth
4: end if
5: if role==false then
6: if ( bandwidth ≤ addr.bandwidth) then
7: totalMoney = price ∗ bandwidth
8: deposit [msg.sender]←
deposit [msg.sender]−totalMoney
9: deposit [ addr]←
deposit [ addr] +totalMoney
10: msg.sender.bandwidth = 0
11: addr.bandwidth= addr.bandwidth- bandwidth
12: else if ( bandwidth addr.bandwidth) then
13: totalMoney= price* addr.bandwidth
14: deposit [msg.sender]←
deposit [msg.sender]−totalMoney
15: deposit [ addr]←
deposit [ addr] +totalMoney
16: msg.sender.bandwidth←
msg.sender.bandwidth- bandwidth
17: addr.bandwidth = 0
18: end if
19: end if
C. The payment clearing
In order to implement the punishment of malicious OPs and
the payment transferring of registered OPs, three functions
including the payORnot ( ), the increaseFunds( ) and the
withdraw( ) are designed in the MOSS smart contract. The
specific functionalities of payORnot ( ), increaseFunds( ) and
withdraw( ) are described as follows.
• payORnot( ): A function modifier ownerOnly is set in
the payORnot ( ), which regulates that the payORnot ( )
can only be called by the government. Other blockchain
nodes do not have the permission to call the payORnot
( ). During the period of [tb , te], the government who is
a regulatory authority needs to ensure that the exchange
of spectrum usage right is executed correctly. The bool
variable executeORnot is defined in the MOSS smart con-
tract to represent whether the corresponding OP correctly
exchanges the spectrum usage right. If the OP does not
exchange the spectrum usage right based on matched
results of the MOSS smart contract, the government can
call the payORnot ( ) to set the executeORnot value
of corresponding OP as false. Thus malicious OPs are
prevented from withdrawing their remaining deposit. As
for honest OPs, the government calls the payORnot ( ) to
set the executeORnot of honest OPs as true and honest
OPs can successfully withdraw their remaining deposit.
6• increaseFunds( ): The increaseFunds( ) is defined as
payable for multi-OPs to increase their deposit in the
MOSS smart contract. The increaseFunds( ) is called
by OPs when the remaining deposit is not enough to be
transferred to other OPs. Thus the payment transferring
of spectrum trading can be executed smoothly.
• withdraw( ): All OPs participating in the spectrum shar-
ing will call the withdraw( ) to get back the remaining
deposit at the end time of [tb , te]. When OPs whose
value of the executeORnot are false call the withdraw(
) to get back the remaining deposit, the miner will not
package this transaction. Honest Ops whose value of
the executeORnot are true can smoothly take back the
remaining deposit by calling the withdraw( ).
The proposed MOSS smart contract can resolve the problem
with the existence of malicious OPs in the spectrum sharing.
The government can punish malicious OPs through the MOSS
smart contract, making them unable to take back the deposit.
A fair and secure spectrum sharing market can be built by
prompting all OPs honestly exchange the spectrum usage right.
IV. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS
In this senction, the consortium blockchain based on the
Geth, which is an official Golang implementation of Ethereum
protocol, is firstly constructed for the spectrum sharing among
multi-OPs. Second, the designed MOSS smart contract is
implemented and tested in the Remix IDE found at http:
//remix.ethereum.org. The Remix is a browser-based IDE
for developing smart contracts without the need to install
the Solidity environment, which is an object-oriented, high-
level language for implementing smart contracts. Finally, the
security and reliability analysis of the proposed solution are
given in the following.
A. Implementation of the Consortium Blockchain
A real consortium blockchain based on the Geth is im-
plemented for the spectrum sharing among multi-OPs. Seven
nodes on seven different computer terminals, which refer to six
different OPs and the government, are created and connected
to each other for building the consortium blockchain. The
Ethereum accounts of seven nodes are preallocated 100 eth
when the genesis block is created. The locally constructed
consortium blockchain can be connected with the Remix IDE
using the web3 provider. The deployment and test of the
MOSS smart contract can be realized by the Remix. The
accounts and balances of seven nodes are shown in Fig 3.
B. Testing of the MOSS Smart Contract
The designed MOSS smart contract is compiled in
the Remix IDE and tested in the constructed consortium
blockchain. Nodes can send transactions to deploy the MOSS
smart contract and call functions through their Ethereum
addresses in the consortium blockchain.
Three seller OPs and three buyer OPs are considered to
test the feasibility of the MOSS smart contract. The Ethereum
addresses and spectrum demands of all entities are shown
Fig. 3. Ethereum accounts and balances of seven nodes.
TABLE II
ACCOUNTS AND SPECTRUM BID INFORMATION OF EACH ENTITY.
Role Account Address Amount(MHZ) Price(Gwei/MHZ)
government 0xd769 . . . e4AC - -
seller OP1 0x36d2 . . . E1fE 20 2000000
seller OP2 0x5E6E . . . f1A0 10 1600000
seller OP3 0x0004 . . . 561d 15 2400000
buyer OP4 0x5B84 . . . 2631 10 1500000
buyer OP5 0x8c66 . . . 1155 12 2500000
buyer OP6 0x9508 . . . bcaa 8 1800000
in Table 2. Based on Ethereum accounts provided by the
constructed consortium blockchain, the MOSS smart contract
is tested and the gas consumption of each function in the
MOSS smart contract is estimated. The gas cost is related
to the transaction fee paid by the transaction sender. The
transaction fee, the unit of which is Ether, can be calculated
as
Transaction fee = Gas cost×Gas price,. (2)
where the value of gas price affects the speed at which the
transaction is processed by miners. The higher the transaction
fee is set by the transaction sender, the faster the transaction
is packaged into the block by miners and the shorter the delay
in execution of the transaction.
Based on the current recommended gas price found at
https://ethgasstation.info/, the gas price is set as 4.3 Gwei,
where wei is the minimum unit of ether and 1ether =
109Gwei=1018wei. Considering that the gas cost is related to
different operations defined in the functions, all the gas cost of
the specific functions called by the government are calculated
and shown in Table 3. The corresponding Ether cost and the
cost in Chinese Yuan (CNY) yuan are also calculated and given
in Table 3. The current exchange rate between the Ether and
CNY is 1 Ether=1041.95 CNY. From Table 3, the Ether cost
of deploying the MOSS smart contract is 0.0204989 eth and
almost 21.35 yuan. The gas consumption of DoubleAuction( )
function is 0.001583935 eth and 1.65 yuan. The Ether cost of
remaining functions are modest and negligible.
The gas cost of all functions called by OPs and the cost of
Ether are shown in Table 4, where the cost in CNY is also
calculated and given. From Table 4, it is obvious that only
the BidOrAskSubmit( ), the cost of which is 0.001 eth and
7TABLE III
GAS COST OF FUNCTIONS CALLED BY THE GOVERNMENT.
Function Transaction Gas Gas Fee in
Ether
Cost in
CNY
MOSS smart contract 4767204 gas 0.0204989 21.35
RegistrationEnd( ) 28935 gas 0.0001244205 0.12
sortAskByIncrease( ) 70696 gas 0.00030399 0.31
sortBidByDecrease( ) 116557 gas 0.000501195 0.52
DoubleAuction( ) 368357 gas 0.001583935 1.65
freeTradeBegin( ) 42413 gas 0.000182375 0.19
MarketEnd( ) 28957 gas 0.000124515 0.12
payORnot( ) 29018 gas 0.000124777 0.13
changeOwner( ) 28811 gas 0.000123887 0.13
selfDestruct( ) 13495 gas 0.000058028 0.06
TABLE IV
GAS COST OF FUNCTIONS CALLED BY OPS.
Function Transaction Gas Gas fee in ether Cost in
CNY
BidOrAskSubmit( ) 216416 gas 0.00100362 1.04
deleteOrder( ) 21229 gas 0.0000912847 0.09
orderResponse( ) 35085 gas 0.00015086 0.15
withdraw( ) 22188 gas 0.000095408 0.09
increaseFunds( ) 26757 gas 0.000115055 0.11
1.04 yuan, consumes the most gas among all functions called
by OPs in the MOSS smart contract. And the overall cost of
remaining functions called by OPs are modest.
From Table 3 and Table 4, the gas cost and CNY cost of
functions called by OPs are almost negligible compared to
the cost of functions called by the government. The proposed
MOSS smart contract does not require too much extra gas cost
from OPs. OPs can trade the spectrum with the modest cost,
which motivates OPs to participate in the proposed spectrum
sharing market. Different from the spectrum broker that exists
as a third party in previous studies, the government does not
directly participate in the spectrum allocation among multi-
OPs in our proposed solution. The spectrum allocation among
multi-OPs is implemented based on predefined functions in
the MOSS smart contract. The government only acts as a
deployer and caller of functions in the MOSS smart contract,
and supervises the entire spectrum sharing process.
The LogRegisterOp event is triggered when OPs call the
BidOrAskSubmit( ). Fig 4(a) shows the transaction log when
the seller OP1 calls the BidOrAskSubmit( ) to submit the
bid information. From the log field shown in Fig 4(a), the
Ethereum address of OP1 is 0x36d2E1Fe, the amount band-
width that the OP1 wants to sell is 20MHZ in the simulation
and the price per unit bandwidth is set as 2000000 Gwei.
All nodes in the blockchain that listen to the LogRegisterOp
will receive the latest registration information of OP1. Other
OPs can reasonably adjust their own bids based on the bid
information of OP1. Meanwhile, OPs can set their own price
in the next round of spectrum sharing by learning the bid
information of other OPs in each round. The probability of
successful match in the spectrum auction process will increase.
The account balance of OP1 is almost 98.99 eth shown
in Fig 4(b). The OP1 is required to deposit 1 eth in the
MOSS smart contract when the BidOrAskSubmit( ) is called.
The gap between the account balance of OP1 and 99 eth is
(a)
(b)
Fig. 4. Calling the BidOrAskSubmit( ) by the seller OP1 (a) the transaction
log (b) the balance of account.
the transaction fee when the transaction is sent to call the
BidOrAskSubmit( ).
Fig. 5. Transaction log of calling the DoubleAuction( ) by the Government.
Fig 5 shows the transaction log when the government
calls the DoubleAuction( ). The predefined spectrum auction
algorithm in the DoubleAuction( ) is executed by miners.
If there exist successfully matches among multi-OPs in the
spectrum auction, the LogDealRecord is triggered. It can be
seen from the log field in Fig 5 that the seller OP2 and the
buyer OP5 have successfully traded 10 MHz of spectrum at
a price of 2050000 Gwei. Also, the seller OP1 and the buyer
OP5 have successfully traded 2 MHz of spectrum at a price
of 2250000 Gwei. The remaining OPs fail to match in the
DoubleAuction( ) stage.
After the spectrum auction, the freeTradeBegin( ) is called
by the government to open the spectrum free-trading market
among unsuccessfully matched OPs. In the simulation, the
seller OP1 is assumed to enter the free-trading market and
8modify the bid price to 1800000 Gwei by calling the or-
derResponse( ). The remaining unsuccessfully matched buyer
OPs can decide whether to participate in the free-trading
market based on the latest bid information of OP1. If the
buyer OP6 decides to purchase the spectrum after listening
to the modified bid information of OP1, the buyer OP6 can
call the orderResponse( ) to declare the desired spectrum
information and reach a successful match. It can be seen from
the transaction log field in Fig 6 that the buyer OP6 and the
seller OP1 have successfully traded 8 MHz spectrum at a price
of 1800000 Gwei.
Fig. 6. Transaction log of calling the orderResponse( ) by the buyer OP6.
When the free-trading market is ended, the entire spectrum
sharing process is completed. Each OP can call the withdraw( )
to withdraw the remaining deposit in the MOSS smart contract.
The seller OP2 is assumed to be a malicious OP in the
simulation. After successfully matched with the buyer OP5
in the previous spectrum auction, the traded spectrum usage
right of OP2 is not correctly delivered to the corresponding
buyer OP5 within the period of [tb , te]. The government can
call the payORnot( ) to set the executeORnot of OP2 as false
and freeze the account balance of OP2. If the withdraw( )
function is called to withdraw the deposit by the seller OP2,
the transaction is rolled back and declared as ”Invalid op”
shown in Fig 7. Other honest OPs can successfully withdraw
their deposits by calling the withdraw( ). It can be seen from
Fig 8(a) that the transaction log field of honest OP1 is shown
as ”successful to withdraw”. The account balance of OP1 is
more than 100 eth shown in Fig 8(b), which indicates that the
seller OP1 can withdraw its 1 eth deposit and earn the extra
revenue from selling the spectrum usage right.
Fig. 7. Transaction log of calling the withdraw( ) by the seller OP2.
C. Performance analysis
1) SECURITY ANALYSIS: In traditional multi-OPs spec-
trum sharing solutions, the problem of privacy disclosure exists
when multi-OPs interact with the spectrum broker. Besides, the
data sent by multi-OPs to the trustless spectrum broker may
be maliciously tampered with. In this paper, the blockchain
technology is used to realize the spectrum sharing among
multi-OPs. All transactions and spectrum usage status are
recorded in a data structure of merkle tree in the blockchain.
All transactions need to be signed with the private key of
(a)
(b)
Fig. 8. Calling the withdraw( ) by the seller OP1 (a) the transaction log (b)
the balance of account.
transaction sender and verified by the public key of transaction
receiver. Each consensus node in the blockchain locally main-
tains a distributed ledger to record all transactions broadcasted
in the blockchain. The openness of spectrum sharing among
multi-OPs can be ensured. If there exist malicious OPs who
want to tamper with the transaction information, honest OPs
who account for a large proportion will not modify their own
local ledger. The integrity and security of data can be ensured
by the proposed solution. Besides, the consortium blockchain
among multi-OPs is constructed in this paper. Different from
the public blockchain, the private data of OPs is invisible
to nodes outside the consortium blockchain. The privacy
preserving of multi-OPs in the spectrum sharing process can
be realized in the proposed solution.
2) RELIABILITY ANALYSIS: Based on the decentraliza-
tion characteristic of blockchain, each OP in the consortium
blockchain maintains a local ledger in a distributed structure.
When one of OPs fails, other OPs can still normally operate.
The single point of failure is avoided in the proposed solution,
which is more reliable than traditional centralized spectrum
sharing solutions. Besides, the MOSS smart contract is de-
signed to implement the spectrum allocation among multi-OPs,
eliminating the existence of centralized spectrum broker in tra-
ditional methods. Before starting the spectrum sharing, multi-
OPs jointly design the logic of spectrum allocation scheme in
the MOSS smart contract. The entire spectrum sharing process
is automatically executed based on the agreed functions in the
9MOSS smart contract, which ensures the fairness of spectrum
sharing in multi-OPs wireless communication networks.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a consortium blockchain trust framework is
proposed for the spectrum sharing in multi-OPs wireless com-
munication networks. The MOSS smart contract is designed
to automatically perform the spectrum trading and payment
transferring among multi-OPs. A fair spectrum sharing market
among multi-OPs can be realized without the existence of
third party. The gas cost of each function defined in the
MOSS smart contract is tested based on the constructed
consortium blockchain, indicating the feasibility of MOSS
smart contract. The security and the reliability analysis of the
proposed solution are evaluated. The simulation results and the
performance analysis demonstrate that the privacy, openness
and fairness of the proposed solution are better than traditional
spectrum allocation solutions.
In the future work, designing an efficient auction algorithm
will be considered to further reduce the gas cost of calling
functions in the MOSS smart contract.
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